

INCOMPLETE VERSION. DO NOT CITE!!!

Loyalties in Climate Change Debate: Caring About Indigenous Environmental Interests

Reyes Espinoza

Purdue University

Las Lealtades en el Debate sobre el Cambio Climático: Cuidando los Intereses Ambientales

Indígenas

Areas of specialization are existentialism with an emphasis on social and political theory, aesthetics, and ethical theory (meta, normative, and applied); Area of competence are Philosophy of Race and Latin American Philosophy

Anticipated graduation date, PhD in Philosophy: May 2018.

Institutional Affiliation: Purdue University in Indiana, USA

INCOMPLETE VERSION. DO NOT CITE!!!

Extended abstract 400-500 words

My research focuses on advocating for a particular strategy for mitigation of anthropogenic climate change and the preservation of natural resources. I argue that to slow down anthropogenic climate change global forces, inclusive of governments, NGOs, and regular citizens, should help indigenous peoples in their plight to protect their territories and property. The particular case I highlight is the killing of Honduran environmental activists in Honduras by military members of that country at the behest of the federal government as well as the likely involvement of an energy company. The reason they are killed is because the activists want companies that encroach on their lands to compensate them fairly for their property as well as to use practices that minimize harm to the environment when these companies excavate for oil and other natural resources. If global forces were to focus more on the human rights and interests of these indigenous communities, this would have a mitigation effect on climate change.

Climate change on the part of human society is a contemporary and pressing challenge for us. Some examples that contribute to this kind of climate change on a grand-scale are the following: flying commercial airplanes, inefficient energy consumption by commercial businesses, factory farming of meat-producing animals, and coal power plants without an apparatus of capture for carbon emissions. As a collective entity, humans are not well prepared for numerous climate change scenarios that would adversely affect billions of people as well as forests, oceans, polar bears, whales, or coral reefs. By the end of the paper, the hope is to connect the mechanisms for social norms that are innate in individuals, developed over millions of years of human evolution, to the collective entity that is “humanity” in such a way as to help combat the negative effects of climate change for human populations and as much of the natural world (non-human animals, forests, coral reefs, etc.) as possible.

The central question that this essay tries to contend with is, what are good options for dealing with climate change at the level of culture, every day moral actions, and actions possible by small activist groups? I argue that it is necessary to engage the sentiment and emotion of loyalty to the human species through an “intermediary” in order to maintain climate change commitments by “regular” citizens and the groups (institutions) they create outside of more strict and structured entities, such as governments and universities. I explain why, based on human normative psychology and tribal social instincts, engaging the sentiment of loyalty to the human species at the level of culture is important for climate change. I conclude that we should support the efforts of indigenous environmental groups through monetary contributions and by bringing awareness to their cause to protect their homelands from intrusion by companies trying to divest them of their natural resources through extortion and illicit business practices.

Keywords: Climate change, social norms, environmental activism, Honduras, Berta Cáceres

Palabras Clave: Cambio Climático, normas sociales, activismo ambiental, Honduras, Berta Cáceres

Abstract

The central question that this essay tries to contend with is, what are good options for dealing with climate change at the level of culture, every day moral actions, and actions possible by small activist groups? I will argue that it is necessary to engage the sentiment and emotion of loyalty to the human species through an “intermediary” in order to maintain climate change commitments by “regular” citizens and the groups (institutions) they create outside of more strict and structured entities, such as governments and universities. I will explain why, based on human normative psychology and tribal social instincts, engaging the sentiment of loyalty to the human species at the level of culture is important for climate change. The main strategy I offer is to, more often than not, side with indigenous environmental groups and individual environmental activists. By “side with” I mean support their efforts through monetary contributions and by bringing awareness to their cause to protect their homelands from intrusion by companies trying to divest them of their natural resources through extortion and illicit business practices.

Keywords: Climate change, normative psychology, cultural change, activism, Berta Cáceres, Honduras

Loyalties in Climate Change Debate: Caring About Indigenous Environmental Interests

Berta Cáceres, co-founder of National Council of Popular and Indigenous Organizations of Honduras (Copihn) and organizer for the Lenca people (BBC Mundo, 2016, March 3), is a recently murdered environmental activist from Honduras, killed March 3rd, 2016 (The Guardian, 2016, March 4). She won the 2015 Goldman Environmental Prize, “the world’s leading environmental award” as a “recognition” for her successful efforts in effectively battling “to stop construction” at “the Agua Zarca cascade of four giant dams in the Gualcarque river basin” (The Guardian, 2015, April 19).

She was killed by military members from Honduras at the command of then active military officials of the country, according to credible testimony from First Sergeant Rodrigo Cruz (a pseudonym), whose identity was confirmed by “academics, community leaders, and activists” (The Guardian, 2016, June 21). Berta’s daughter, Olivia Zúñiga, in an interview on Nicaraguan television, accused the Honduran government and Desarrollos Energéticos S.A. (DESA) of being complicit in and orchestrating the murder of her mother (La Prensa Gráfica, 2016, May 10). One suspect arrested for the murder connected to DESA was employee Sergio Rodríguez Orellana, manager for social and environmental issues, who said he was “surprised” by his detainment (The New York Times, 2016, May 2).

No doubt this is a tragic series of events. As for “first” world moviegoers observing the scenes of corruption at the highest levels in Central America, should our loyalties be with the deceased environmental activist and her memory or with a big corporation? This is a false dichotomy, there’s more than two options to choose from, but there is also more tragedy to spell out regarding environmental activists in Latin America. Still, the movement from this set of players--federal governments, corporations, and indigenous environmental activists--in contemporary events serves to launch us into the debate at hand.

The central question that this essay tries to contend with is, what are good options for dealing with climate change at the level of culture, everyday moral actions, and actions possible by small activist groups? I will argue that it is necessary to engage the sentiment and emotion of loyalty to the human species through an “intermediary” in order to maintain climate change commitments by “regular” citizens and the groups (institutions) they create outside of more strict and structured entities, such as governments and universities. I will explain why, based on human normative psychology and tribal social instincts, engaging the sentiment of loyalty to the human species at the level of culture is important for climate change. The main strategy I offer is to, more often than not, side with indigenous environmental groups and individual environmental activists. By “side with” I mean support their efforts through monetary contributions and by bringing awareness to their cause to protect their homelands from intrusion by companies trying to divest them of their natural resources through extortion and illicit business practices.

The long history of blatant dismissal by federal governments in the Americas may be enough of a reason to side with them now, but this is not the reason I highlight. The reason for siding with these groups, I argue, is because they embody in the most real and dramatic fashion the fight against multiple forces that converge in the phrase “climate change.” No one group is negatively affected more and receives lesser benefits from urbanization and globalization than indigenous cultures near significant natural resources.

Preliminaries

Humans have a learning mechanism for social norms in place from birth, that will develop as they age (Nichols, 2002). Moral and social norms themselves (the rules for navigating human societies and propensity for altruistic action) are acquired at an early age and implemented through various personal and group-dependent psychological mechanisms, including punishment for those that deviate from the group norm and varying levels of reward for those that comply with the group norms (Sripada & Stich, 2006). One contemporary and pressing challenge for human societies is in dealing appropriately with climate change caused largely in part by human actions. Some examples that contribute to this kind of climate change on a grand-scale are the following: flying commercial airplanes, inefficient energy consumption by commercial businesses, factory farming of meat-producing animals, and coal power plants without an apparatus of capture for carbon emissions. As a collective entity, humans are not well prepared for numerous climate change scenarios (Gardiner, 2011) that would adversely affect billions of people as well as forests, oceans, polar bears, whales, or coral reefs. By the end of the paper, the hope is to connect the mechanisms for social norms that are innate in individuals, developed over millions of years of human evolution, to the collective entity that is “humanity” in such a way as to help combat the negative effects of climate change for human populations and as much of the natural world (non-human animals, forests, coral reefs, etc.) as possible.

Part 1: The Dire and Largely Unpredictable Aspects of Climate Change

Stephen M. Gardiner’s *The Perfect Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change* (2011) is an invaluable resource to scholars and policymakers eager to find solutions to climate change. At the same time, it’s drawback is its complexity and length; it is not the type of book one would typically read on vacation. Then again, climate change is not a topic one wants to think about on vacation. You fly to Hawaii on a commercial airline, you don’t buy carbon offsets, and because you want the best you buy FIJI® brand bottled water, when tap water is readily available to you. Still, when we are not in a vacation mindset, many of us are trying to do what we can to consume less, especially material goods, and do what we can, on a personal and institutional level, to encourage the growth and adoption of renewable fuel sources in numerous sectors of the economy and social life.

Gardiner’s *The Perfect Storm* is an invaluable resource to scholars and policymakers because it provides detailed arguments on why the problems associated with climate change are not likely to go away without purposeful plans and execution of them to improve climate conditions for current and future generations.

Our best moral theories, according to Gardiner, do not offer a good framework for thinking about “issues characteristic of long-term global problems such as climate change” and are also not well positioned to help us discuss “intergenerational equity, international justice, scientific uncertainty [regarding the climate], persons whose existence and preferences are contingent on the choices we make, and the human relationship to animals and the rest of nature” (213). Robert Elliot (2011) largely agrees with Gardiner, rehearsing almost the same line of argument regarding the “rest of nature” when he says, “...the destruction and despoliation of natural systems engenders [a strong negative response, in fact, a moral response]. This involves the application of ethical categories to domains in which they have historically not been applied. Ethical categories and ethical systems have for too long had primarily a human focus, with

limited application outside the human domain" (177). Furthermore, climate change in particular, but the other issues associated with it, like intergenerational equity, to some degree, are "not normal political problems," according to Gardiner (213). Hence, we need new tools to think them through.

At the heart of the matter, Gardiner says it is "highly plausible" that "traditional approaches," such as utilitarianism, libertarianism, Rawlsian liberalism, nationalism and communitarianism, are theoretically inept (213 and 230). Climate change is supposed to be a case that helps us see how our systems of political action and thought need to be reoriented.

One of the most important parts of the book is his Global Test, found in section 1 of chapter 7. Here is the best formulation of it. *The Global Test*: "Under these assumptions, we seem to have identified an important global test for social and political institutions and theories: if either does not respect the claim that failure to address a serious global threat is a criticism of it, and a potentially fatal one, *then it is inadequate and must be rejected*" (217; emphasis in original). Gardiner's most important evaluation of the Global Test is that it is highly relevant for current concerns and that the test has largely been ignored in discourse dominated by "scientific, economic, and short-term geopolitical concerns" (2011, 219). Thus, even though the test is obvious in some ways, it has not been an important part of the discourse on climate change, even though it would be instructive in many ways.

Gardiner claims that in the "theoretical storm"-- which is comprised of problems with candidate theories for reasoning about the environment--climate change involves the intersection of a number of problems. Moreover, as stated previously, conventional approaches to public policy are not well equipped to handle the following problems associated with the theoretical storm: 1) Uncertainty 2) the very long-term 3) the creation of different preferences and persons (213). There is a specific problem that climate change raises that other similar policy problems, such as family leave policies, do not have. That specific problem has to do with security: if the environment changes too drastically, there is reasonable fear that there could be massive shortages of the basic needs like food, water, and shelter. However, we can still be more specific as to why climate change is a special problem. Contemporary climate change, one problematic regarding the dynamic nature of ecosystems, is usually caused by inputs to physical and ecological systems that brings about alterations in those systems. Moreover, these alterations cause impacts on all sentient life and the environments they are a part of. There are many dimensions for the possible alterations, and we don't know all the negative consequences that can come about (Gardiner, 2011, 189).

Section two of chapter seven dictates there are four salient scenarios that are important for the security concerns of humanity and for the well-being of our and future generations. Here they are:

1. Soft Landing: creeping change with significant but highly malleable, negative impacts
2. Rough Landing: Substantial change with major, and moderately malleable, negative impacts.
3. Hard Landing: Dramatic change with severe, and poorly malleable, negative impacts.
4. Crash Landing: Spectacular change with catastrophic negative impacts with no malleability. (223)

Perhaps conventional institutions and theories can handle the first two change scenarios (soft and rough), but are likely not able to handle the latter two (hard and crash). Since "climate change" is too broad a term, the salient change scenarios are important to keep in mind. The latter two, hard and crash landings, are what most worries Gardiner in relation to conventional

institutions and theories (2011, 224). Using Gardiner's framework, the Global Test shows us that if it is the case that conventional theories and institutions are bad at handling certain scenarios, as they are when it comes to the Hard Landing and Crash Landing, they should be criticized for it.

The last of Gardiner's analysis on climate change I wish to bring up is that there is serious problems with the economic theories undergirding policy analysis concerning climate change. In fact, "a focus on climate economics is likely to facilitate moral corruption" (297). Thus, the theoretical storm, the other two storms being global and intergenerational storms, is a problem that, if not handled appropriately, realistically leads to a catastrophe for climate change. Moreover, a "preoccupation with economics threatens to induce a convenient paralysis" (297). The paralysis here alludes to not doing anything proactive when it comes to climate change. The paralysis mindset can be seen in the following two scenarios. Scenario one has a bleak view of the future: the effects of climate change will be felt soon, so we shouldn't bother ourselves to mitigate it because it hurts us economically. Scenario two is optimistic about the future: market forces will help create technologies to stop any awful effects of climate change. In either scenario, the current generation takes no intentional actions to curtail climate change. Both scenarios are nihilistic, defeatist, conformist, and likely not good for future generations, the current global community, and nature outside of humanity.

Part 2: Haidt, Gardiner, Alain Locke and Heinrich & Richerson On Values and Loyalty

How do evangelical pastors come to lead congregations of faithful followers, including convincing them to donate millions of dollars to their religious organizations? How do politicians drum up sentiments of anger from their constituents for their political gain? Why does loyalty to the nation's protection or treason against it elicit an affective response from many? Satisfactory answers to these questions will not be pursued here; however, their underlying psychological mechanisms will be explored.

Loyalty is an integral but underdeveloped aspect of moral psychology, and one which must be taken into account for a satisfactory answer to the questions raised above. Explaining why loyalty is part of the human experience is largely ignored by moral psychologists. Perhaps this is an unfair charge against moral psychologists since, for some philosophers, moral psychology is about accounting for certain emotions and intentions in moral theory. Thus, more importantly for moral psychologists, accounting for loyalty in ethical systems or including it in moral calculations should be necessary for understanding and explaining people's ethical choices. Consequently, if the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) is a reliable guide of the field, then my assessment of loyalty as being ignored by moral psychologists is not far off. SEP's entry on "Moral Psychology: Empirical Approaches" does not mention the word "loyalty" once. Some may contend that the debate between egoism and altruism tracks certain aspects of loyalty, but despite any similarities, it is not exactly the same.

Offering hope for the future, Jonathan Haidt (2011) *The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided By Politics and Religion* provides a highly plausible account of how human morality differs from other species and how it has helped us achieve large-scale cooperation (Haidt, 2011, Introduction), while including loyalty in its explanation of large-scale cooperation. For Haidt, the brain is a "first draft" that nature provides, that has language, morality, sexuality, etc. written on it, and one's upbringing and social circumstances shape it further in time (152-153). As regards loyalty, Haidt argues that "Secular West" moralities have a propensity to speak

of and account for harm and fairness, while leaving aside four other moral “taste receptors” (Haidt, 2011, Introduction).

Those four other moral values are liberty, loyalty, authority, and sanctity (Haidt, 2011, Introduction). In Haidt’s “Moral Foundations Theory” foundation number three is loyalty/betrayal. Haidt states, “The Loyalty/betrayal foundation is just a part of our innate preparation for meeting the adaptive challenge of forming cohesive coalitions. The original trigger for the loyalty foundation is anything that tells you who is a team player and who is a traitor, particularly when your team is fighting with other teams” (162). Haidt has given moral psychology much to build on and ponder going forward regarding the foundations of morality and, for my purposes, has given an excellent introduction to understanding loyalty in general through the Loyalty foundation. Again, composed of loyalty and betrayal.

Loyalty and Climate Change

An exploration and explanation of loyalty in the debate on the effects on global climate change by humanity is of the utmost importance if we want to help solve the “perfect moral storm” Gardiner analyzes. While Gardiner does an excellent job in examining the convergence of the global, intergenerational, and theoretical aspects of this debate, his analysis of why we ‘pass the buck’ is incomplete without accounting for why people choose some commitments rather than others. ‘Passing the buck’ in this respect refers to one generation of humans having knowledge of climate change’s dire effects, but hoping that a future generation finds the ways to survive any catastrophic effects, or simply not caring what the future generation does with its societal structure.

Gardiner’s analysis of intergenerational buck-passing, when it comes to individual commitments and his objections to the 2 arguments in the appendixes (“The Population Tragedy” and “Epistemic Corruption and Scientific Uncertainty in Michael Crichton’s State of Fear”) of his book, is incomplete without accounting for how human loyalty operates. Humans are typically loyal to people, rather than to abstract categories in which real people make up the category as an aggregate. This can be recognized in the assessment by Gardiner that “the affective mechanism [as opposed to the “analytical” mechanism] is likely to result in a particular problem’s being marginalized by other—perhaps objectively less important concerns that do so engage” (2011, 194). The analytical and affective mechanisms “acquire information in different ways: the affective tends to rely on personal experience, whereas the analytical favors statistical descriptions...” (2011, 193). Thus, I conjecture, it is easier to have loyalty to individual people than to the species. Then, examples that do not easily activate our cognitive mechanism for loyalty are future generations, especially when they are not one’s children, and the global poor (who are very far away and many in the West do not personally know). These are both “categories” instead of flesh and blood individual humans.

The global poor and future generations are both examples of the human species, itself an abstract and impersonal category. Part of the project of this paper is to give a “face” to the global poor that we can rally behind; that face is that of indigenous populations around the world that are adversely affected by climate change. Concrete suggestions on how to use evolved personal psychology to aid in the struggle against climate change in connection with indigenous populations will be presented in part three.

Tribal Social Instincts, Collective Action, and a Non-Neutral Setting

Richerson and Henrich will serve as the main framework for discussing tribal social instincts. Part three then explains how these can be harnessed to help with combating climate change and accelerate mobilization at the level of informal institutions.

The evolution of humanity is a topic often hard to breach. It is much easier to understand how other animals evolved, but, despite the complexities, humans have a long history of evolution. “The evolution of humans from primate ancestors involved the evolution of sympathy, loyalty, and pride in one’s contribution to the group. These qualities originally supported simple tribes in which food was shared, territory defended, and rules enforced without any top-down leadership” (Richerson & Henrich, 2012, 57). Sympathy, loyalty, and pride are three emotions or functional values that form a substantive part of humanity’s “tribal social instincts.” Undergirding these instincts, which still accompany human societies, is “gene-culture coevolution” (Richerson & Henrich, 2012, 38). A comprehensive and concise description of this process is the following.

The cultural and genetic elements of our social psychology interacted over the long run of human evolution. To judge from the stone tools humans left behind...human cultural sophistication probably evolved in several waves after about 2.6 million years ago....Molecular evidence suggests that humans have undergone a burst of genetic evolution in the wake of the origins of agriculture and some controversial arguments hold that psychological traits as well as those related to disease and diet responded in a major way to the development of food production and the larger, more sophisticated societies it made possible. (Richerson & Henrich, 2012, 58)

Thus, tribal social instincts are in place in humans today because of early humans’ circumstances and their ongoing interaction with others humans and locales throughout history. In line with the evidence, “enormous collective action enterprises” were made possible by “our ability to cooperate and trust conditionally” (Richerson & Henrich, 2012, 58). Cooperation and trusting conditionally can be seen as the consequences from the evolution of sympathy, loyalty, and pride. Furthermore, for Daniel Dennett, “Our wills are free, in the morally relevant sense, because our ancestors’ superior capacities to take responsibility and commit to courses of action gave them comparable advantages over competitors” (Zawidzki, 2007, 126). Part of loyalty is the capacity for long-term planning, even on a non-conscious level. The ability for taking responsibility and committing to courses of action does not necessarily require promise keeping and language, it may be enough to take care of your young and group for some amount of time.

In conjunction with contemporary ongoing cultural evolution, human organizations operate on similar tribal social principles as early humans. Organizations that have too many employees that act selfishly as opposed to having a bigger concern for the organization as a whole tend to do be worse off than those that have ‘good norms’; good norms are “social norms that effectively harness aspects of our evolved psychology in ways that led to success in inter-group competition” (Richerson & Henrich, 2012, 57). Overtime, cultural evolution has favored these kinds of groups because they work with our evolved psychology and operate under similar guidelines as previous tribal social instincts for trying to benefit the group.

Having the capacity to be loyal does not of itself dictate what you should be loyal to. On this point, Gardiner says, “The perfect storm constitutes a non-neutral evaluative setting, and this poses special challenges for ethical action...we must pay attention to the ways important values are articulated, since the likelihood of their perversion is high” (xi). Similarly, Locke endorsed a

reconceptualization of, "...the Roycean principle of "loyalty to loyalty," which though idealistic in origin and defense, was a radical break with the tradition of absolutism. It called for a revolution in the practise of partisanship in the very interests of the values professed. In its larger outlines and implications it proclaimed a relativism of values and a principle of reciprocity [that dictates no culture stays static and that they take from many sources to create their practices]" (49). An obvious difference is that Gardiner is not a full-blown relativist about values. At the same time, Locke's relativism about values may be more palatable to the reader than other formulations of relativism. As Harris summarizes in the Introduction to Locke's works, "Value ultimates or imperatives are really "system imperatives rather than intrinsic absolutes." Values are functional transpositional systems" (79).

In sum, values play an important role for both Locke and Gardiner when it comes to collective action on a world-scale and they both believe that some values are not conducive to positive large-scale human cooperation, as we also see this sentiment in Locke in the next section.

Part 3: My Family, My Lifestyle, My Planet: Lessons from Evolved Personal Psychology to Combat Climate Change Inducing Activities

Guiding questions: How do our loyalties, who and what we are committed to, affect climate change? Is there a good way to mitigate your dual commitment to your personal lifestyle and your family when they are in conflict with staving-off anthropomorphic climate change, that is, climate change that has largely been the result of human civilization?

Loyalty to the human species, to our fellow humans, is one strategy to "fight" global warming, even though it is hard to commit to the human species since it goes against the part of our cognitive mechanisms which dictates that we are typically loyal to individuals and not abstract entities. Commitment to the scientific enterprise (the science of climate change in this case) is a practical, albeit unintuitive, way to demonstrate our loyalty to our fellow humans: the "global poor, future generations..." (Gardiner, xi). Mexican philosopher Antonio Caso, who was an anti-communist and had a complicated relationship to National Socialism, even though he was not speaking of global warming, had a similar intuition when claiming, "It shall be said: if the individual is perishable, the species, on the other hand, is not, and for it will be the final victory" (143, Haddox translation). Locke, while having a similar goal, warned against over reliance of the scientific enterprise to close cultural barriers and bring people closer regarding their goals for society.

One can of course, foresee, even in advance of such a search for value correlations, one inevitably oncoming content unity among our various cultures, a base denominator of modern science and technology. We can hardly conceive our modern world dispensing with this, whatever its other factionalisms. But even if destined to become the common possession of humanity, science and technology are relatively value neutral, and, since they can be fitted in to [sic] such different systems of end values, cannot be relied upon to become deeply influential as unifiers. (Locke, 1944, 76)

Locke is essentially saying that science and technology are not enough on their own to unify the world. By "unify the world" I mean roughly the end of war between nations and an end of conflict between groups of people in general. The world needs to be unified through a

mechanism other than science. This unifying mechanism lies at the level of sociology, and, taking a page from Richerson and Henrich, evolved psychology and tribal social instincts. Science does not control our minds or cultures, even though it may facilitate certain aspects of communication and allows for technological possibilities otherwise not able to be brought into existence. Locke immediately followed the preceding passage with:

Indeed, linked to present-day culture feuds and value intolerances, they [science and technology] can quite more easily serve to intensify the conflict as the geographical distance between cultures is shortened and their technological disparities are leveled off. *It is, after all, our values and value systems that have divided us apart from and in many cases over and above our material issues of rivalry and conflict.* If we are ever to have less conflict and more unity, it must come about in considerable part from some deep change in our *value attitudes and our cultural allegiances*. The increasing proximity of cultures in the modern world makes all the more necessary some corrective adjustment of their “psychological distance.” (Locke, 1944, 76-77; emphasis mine)

Since cultures and value attitudes are what divide people, what creates “psychological distance,” when they are in serious opposition, the scientific enterprise can do little on its own to bring us together. Science and technology may drive us apart as tools of war and destruction of communities or protection of vested corporate and economic interests.

With the environment in mind, Locke’s thought is very similar to Gardiner in the following. “The dominant discourses about the nature of the climate threat are scientific and economic. But the deepest challenge is ethical” (xii). In a similar vein, Locke says, “But the curtailing of the struggle over the means and instrumentalities of values will not eliminate our quarrels and conflicts about ends, and long after the possible elimination of the profit motive, our varied imperatives will still persist” (49). What is “ethical” for Gardiner and “ends” for Locke are the same; this is the realm of moral philosophy. They also converge in another way; both believe that instrumentalities, means, science, profits and economics are not what are at the heart of incommensurable differences among humans, and at the same time they allow for values to take a central role in their moral philosophy.

Concrete Suggestions

Loyalty to your immediate family (mom, dad, brothers and sisters) may be in conflict with your loyalty to the human species, despite the scientific data on climate change and how you ought to change your behavior based on it. Loyalty to your lifestyle may be in conflict with your loyalty to the human species, despite the scientific data on climate change and how you ought to change your behavior based on it. For example, I may truly believe that climate change is happening and that my individual actions contribute to the problem, but I need, or so I have decided, to fly around the world to become more cultured or vacation. I may need to travel to see my family or my work peers. Moreover, I may strongly desire to eat meat, even though it contributes more to climate warming than veganism. In fact, I may need to eat meat for my health, assuming there are such types of human bodies, in order to survive, even though this contributes more to anthropomorphic climate change than veganism. What about the value of nature (mountains, rivers, forests, etc.) when it comes to climate change and the causal role of humanity in substantial changes to them?

Haidt provides moral psychologists with the moral foundation of loyalty/betrayal. This is one moral component that can be used to the advantage of those wishing to address climate change. Based on the preceding considerations by Locke, it is necessary to find “corrective adjustments” to the “psychological distance” between societies and cultures, especially since

scientific findings and new technologies keep closing the geographical gap between them, which has the potential to create conflict if left unchecked (77). Based on Richerson and Henrich, tribal social instincts must be engaged in intergroup cooperation to facilitate large-scale cooperation, even in contemporary societies. Lastly, Gardiner realized that values are at the heart of the climate change debate. Hence, what system of values you adopt and prefer is important in the battle against climate change.

Here is one set of suggestions helpful to those wishing to stop or slow down anthropogenic climate change. “The forces that unite humanity--such as common dominators [sic] of class interest, inclinations to pursue status, disdain for injustice to members of one’s perceived community--can be marshalled to aid the destruction of sinister, unintentional, and structural racial formations of oppression” (Harris, 1999, 449). Not only can they be marshalled to destroy oppressive racial formations, but they also can be marshalled to destroy climate change disasters. Harris’s work on Locke shows in this set of recommendations; one can recognize the respect and working-out of problematics from Alain Locke’s theories. Not only that, but it also respects Richerson and Henrich’s work on tribal social instincts, without explicitly having them in mind.

One of the most entrenched and hardest of topics to discuss in the mind of those in the USA is race. The topic of race shares this with the topic of climate change: even though it is all encompassing and affects our social surroundings, it’s hard to pick out its boundaries, since it is so ubiquitous. Thus, if Harris’s suggestions are good for dismantling racial oppression, they are on the right track for us regarding climate change proposals to change culture when it comes to behaviors that would lead to climate protection. For the purpose of changing culture around climate change, I will only expound on the last of the set Harris presents: “disdain for injustice to members of one’s perceived community.”

Revisiting the case of Berta. Berta’s death is not an isolated incident. Chris Moyo from Global Witness told BBC Mundo that of the 111 murders from 2002-2014 in Honduras of environmental activists 80 of them were in the region Bajo Aguán from 2011-2014, the last three years (March 3, 2016). Chris Moyo further claims that Berta’s death is representative of “systematic persecution” of Honduran environmentalists (BBC Mundo, March 3, 2016). Furthermore, “The Bajo Aguán region – where the Xatruch taskforce is based [this was Rodrigo Cruz’s military unit]– has been the setting for a string of violent land disputes between powerful palm oil magnates and local farmers. More than 100 people, mainly peasant activists, have been killed, many at the hands of state or private security forces” (The Guardian, June 21, 2016). Should our loyalties be with Berta and her memory, supporting Copihñ, the indigenous group supporting environmental rights, or should they be with corporations that try to extract key natural resources near their homelands, often at the detriment to the environment and indigenous groups?

If these indigenous groups are part of our perceived community, we will be outraged at the treatment they have received and receive at the hands of federal governments and energy corporations. This would be because we have a “disdain for injustice to members” of our community. Instead of morality, Harris speaks of “injustice.” This injustice for Harris is of a type grounded in everyday experience, history, sociology, and of course, philosophy. In my assessment, outside of philosophy discussions on morality as such are rare. People are better acquainted with justice than they are with morality as such.

If indigenous groups are a part of our community, we will disdain injustices they experience-- injustice that hurts even more when we know that it’s not only their human dignity

that is being trampled on, but also the soil that feeds them. Still more outrageous and hurtful to us if we saw indigenous groups as part of our perceived community--recounting the plight of others besides Berta: the palm oil that feeds North and South America and is used to make hand lotions and countless other industrial products is constructed through the killing of peasant farmer activists in Central America.

Conclusion

Can we care about the environment in the abstract? No, most of us cannot. I have argued that engaging our sense of loyalty is key to protecting and securing long-term human interests and the long-term survival of environments such as forests, rivers, oceans, and animals that reside therein. One could use explanations for tribal social instincts and the suggestions for engaging the human sentiment of loyalty to help either corporations trying to extract key natural resources from indigenous lands or to help indigenous groups supporting environmental protections. I side with using these insights for helping groups like Copihn, since siding with them tends to help in the fights against climate change. In supporting groups like Copihn one reifies the "global poor." Psychological distance is decreased between the abstract category the global poor and individual psyches when we think of Copihn as an instantiation of a group that makes up the global poor. Copihn was co-founded by the now deceased Berta, killed at the behest of clandestine deals between Honduras, the country's military, and possibly an energy company wanting people like her to disappear because it makes their profits harder to come by when they have to compensate indigenous landowners fairly and clean-up properly when they leave an area. As I present the story, Berta is deserving of your loyalty, while DESA (the energy company in the story), because of its betrayal of one of our perceived world community members--indigenous environmental groups--, does not deserve your loyalty.

References

- Caso, Antonio. (1971). *Antonio Caso: Philosopher of Mexico*. John Haddox (Ed.). Available from <https://play.google.com/books>
- Doris, John and Stich, Stephen, "Moral Psychology: Empirical Approaches", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = [<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/moral-psych-emp/>](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/moral-psych-emp/).
- DPA. (2016, May 10). Hija de berta cáceres culpa a empresa desa, a estado y militares hondureños de asesinato. *La Prensa Gráfica*. Retrieved from <http://www.laprensagrafica.com/2016/05/10/hija-de-berta-caceres-culpa-a-empresa-desa-a-estado-y-militares-hondureos-de-asesinato>
- Elliot, R. (2001). Normative ethics. In D. Jamieson (Ed.), *A companion to environmental philosophy* (177-191). Online: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
- Gardiner, S.M. (2011). *The perfect storm: The ethical tragedy of climate change* [Kindle Cloud Reader version]. Available from Amazon.com
- Haidt, J. (2011). *The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion* [Kindle Cloud Reader version]. Available from Amazon.com.
- Harris, L. (1999). What, then, is Racism?. In L. Harris (Ed.) *Racism* (437-450). New York: Humanity Books.
- Lakhani, Nina. (2016, June 21). Berta cáceres's name was on honduran military hitlist, says former soldier. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/21/berta-caceres-name-honduran-military-hitlist-former-soldier>
- Locke, A. (1944). Cultural relativism and ideological peace. In L. Harris (Ed.), *The philosophy of alain locke: Harlem renaissance and beyond* (69-78). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Malkin, E. (2016, May 2). Honduras arrests 4 men in killing of berta cáceres, indigenous activist. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/03/world/americas/honduras-arrests-4-men-in-killing-of-berta-caceres.html?_r=0
- Martins, A. (2016, March 3). Honduras: matan a berta cáceres, la activista que le torcio' la mano al banco mundial y a china. *BBC Mundo*. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2015/04/150423_honduras_berta_caceres_am

- Nichols, S. (2002). Norms with feeling: Towards a psychological account of moral judgment. *Cognition*, 84, 221-236.
- Richerson, P., & Henrich J. (2012). Tribal social instincts and the cultural evolution of institutions to solve collective action problems. *Cliodynamics*, 3(1), 38-80.
- Sripada, Chandra, & Stich, Stephen. (2006). A framework for the psychology of norms. In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence, & Stephen P. Stich (Eds.), *The innate mind, volume 2: Culture and cognition*. New York: Oxford UP.
- Watts, J. (2016, March 4). Berta cáceres, honduran human rights environment activist, murdered. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/03/honduras-berta-caceres-murder-environment-activist-human-rights>
- Zawidzki, T. (2007). *Dennett*. Oxford: Oneworld Publications.